Chicago Daily Law Bulletin - May 20, 1998
By David Heckelman
Allowing a plaintiff to maintain an action against an attorney under the Consumer Fraud Act would signal an erosion of the state Supreme Court's exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law, a lawyer for the defendant told the high court Wednesday.
Craig L. Unrath of Peoria asked the court to reverse a 3d District Appellate Court decision that would allow plaintiff-guardian Roberta L. Cripe to seek damages under the act against her disabled mother's former attorney for fraudulent billing.
Should the Appellate Court's decision be allowed to stand, it will have a tremendous impact on the legal profession and, more importantly, on this court's ability to regulate the practice of law," Unrath said during oral argument.
He said the effect of the appeals court's ruling was to create a new cause of action, statutory legal malpractice."
He said that if the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act were applied to attorney malpractice cases, defendants would be subject to a standard of strict liability, rather than to the duty of reasonable care" imposed by the current law.
He also said that allowing the plaintiff to seek monetary damages under the act against Peoria attorney Thomas E. Leiter and his firm likely would generate actions against attorneys for other forms of statutory relief.
Do we want our circuit courts disciplining our attorneys?" Unrath asked rhetorically. And he questioned the wisdom of allowing the legislature to set professional standards.
But the lawyer representing plaintiff Cripe, Bradley S. McMillan of the Heiple Law Offices in Peoria, said the issue in the case actually was a narrow one: Does the act apply to attorneys who engage in deceptive billing practices by charging for more hours than actually spent on the case?"
He said the statute was to be liberally construed to effect its purpose" of preventing and punishing fraud against consumers. And he said the plaintiff had alleged that Leiter significantly padded his time records" and overbilled his client by $ 40,000.
McMillan, formerly a partner in Heiple & McMillan and now counsel to the firm headed by Jeremy H. Heiple, said the defendants were seeking a blanket prohibition" on using the act against lawyers.
As a precursor to a question he asked during oral argument, Justice Benjamin K. Miller said the core of McMillan's argument" was that the business aspects" were separate from the other elements of legal practice and that the Consumer Fraud Act trumps" the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct with regard to those business aspects.
He said the plaintiff's attorney's brief also argued that while the Supreme Court has authority to regulate admission to the bar and professional conduct, the legislature had the authority to regulate the business practices of law firms.
Miller then asked whether McMillan believed that the General Assembly had the authority to decide whether law firms could operate as professional corporations.
The attorney responded that he believed the legislature did have that authority. And in an interview after arguments had concluded, McMillan repeated his belief that the Supreme Court's exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law extended solely to matters of admission and discipline.
The present case arose when Leiter and the Leiter Group P.C. began representing the plaintiff's mother, Roberta A. Schmitz, for the purpose of transferring two irrevocable trusts from one bank to another, court records show.
After obtaining guardianship of her mother's estate, the plaintiff filed suit against Leiter and the firm in Peoria County Circuit Court, seeking damages for allegedly improper billing under the Consumer Fraud Act and and on the basis of common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, legal malpractice and constructive fraud.
The trial court dismissed the Consumer Fraud Act count with prejudice, holding that the act did not apply to legal practice or billing for legal services.
The 3d District Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the business aspects' of the practice of law are not exempt from the act." Cripe v. Leiter, 291 Ill.App.3d 161, 683 N.E.2d 514 (1997).
In a separate ruling, the appeals court held that the plaintiff could seek punitive damages from the defendants on the common law fraud count of her complaint. Cripe v. Leiter, 291 Ill.App.3d 155 (1997).
While denying the defendants' petition for leave to appeal regarding the question of punitive damages on Dec. 3, the Supreme Court the same day agreed to hear their appeal of the Consumer Fraud Act decision.
And in oral argument before the high court Wednesday, defense attorney Unrath said the statutory power created by the Appellate Court's ruling eventually could supplant the high court's authority to regulate the practice of law.
For the first time, circuit court judges will be able to directly discipline attorneys beyond their powers of contempt," he said.
Justice Mary Ann G. McMorrow asked if his predictions weren't speculative," in view of the fact that the plaintiffs were seeking only monetary damages.
Unrath, a partner in Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, said that while his concerns might be somewhat speculative," a decision setting a general rule" allowing actions against attorneys under the Consumer Fraud Act likely would open the door to suits for other forms of relief. And he asked the court to reverse the appeals court's decision.
The Illinois State Bar Association and the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel have filed briefs as amici curiae in support of the defendants.
Amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs have been filed by the Chicago Council of Lawyers, the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association and HALT Inc. -- An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform.
Roberta L. Cripe, etc. v. Thomas E. Leiter, et al., No. 84117.
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